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Ransomware attacks have started to affect the hospital industry and cause major
disruptions in operations. There are at least five successful ransomware attacks that have
affected hospitals. The only way they were able to regain access to their systems were to
submit payment via bitcoin to the entity that conveyed the ransom or recover their
systems from backups. In this study, we identified risk factors from published reports for
hospital ransomware attacks. This study employed a qualitative review of published
news articles and reports that discussed the events of the ransomware attacks. This
exploratory method is appropriate for new and emerging topics and used to compare
written text to established guidelines or models. We used the NIST Cyber Security
Framework to code content and analyze information from journal articles, memos, blogs,
research studies and white papers that contained information reported by the hospitals.
iv

Hospitals and media reports were not transparent in reporting detailed information
surrounding the events of ransomware attacks. Overall, study results demonstrate that
there are risk factors for hospitals to become targets for ransomware attacks.

Keywords: Ransomware, malware, cybersecurity, health information security, nist cyber
security framework
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Background and Need
For many decades, the healthcare industry has lagged behind other industries in
adopting and implementing information technology within their workflow. Information
technology has begun to take a role in healthcare that it has never taken before.
Professionals in healthcare can use technology and information systems as a way to
improve their process in improving health care quality, access to care, and operational
processes.

In the past decade, hospitals have taken the dive into the information

technology arena in implementing technology throughout their health systems. The use
of information technology in health care has given access to providers to make informed
decisions in a timely manner and allowed healthcare executives to make operational
decisions.

Information technology is defined as “a set of tools, processes, and

methodologies and associated equipment employed to collect, process, and present
information” (www.businessdictionary.com).

This technology can be accessed via

desktops, laptop computers and mobile devices.
In the past 10 years, the health care industry has gone through many changes in
how they collect, store and utilize health information. From paper records, legacy
systems to implementing new health information technology (HIT), organizations are
able to quickly have access to a patient’s entire medical history. Over the years there has
been a large amount of funding and resources invested in health information technology
by health systems and physician practices. The Office of the National Coordinator for
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Health Information Technology (ONC) was established in 2004 through an executive
order by former President George W. Bush, to coordinate the implementation and use of
health information technology and the electronic exchange of health information. This
establishment was later mandated through legislation under former President Barack
Obama in the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act
(HITECH Act) of 2009 (ONC, 2016).

In an effort to provide assistance and support, the

ONC established Regional Extension Centers (RECs) across the country, which would be
a resource to health care organizations for electronic health record (EHR) implementation
and Health IT needs. The centers are located in every region and serve as trusted
advisors to their communities in providing expertise in the adoption and meaningful use
of electronic health records (RECs, 2015).

As there are many challenges and

opportunities that are facing the healthcare industry, health information technology will
play a part in integrating systems, providing efficiency patient-related data and providing
access to care in underserved areas.
With the implementation of the Health Information Technology for Economic and
Clinical Health (HITECH) Act in 2009, change in health care has become the new norm
and can be quite an enormous task for many organizations to handle without support from
subject matter experts. For many health care organizations, information technology is
being implemented for many different reasons.

There is a strong evidence base

documenting the benefits of electronic health information technology. Health information
technology is reported to contribute to organization efficiency, provider satisfaction,
patient safety, medication adherence, and numerous other indicators of health care quality
(Virga et al., 2012). In recent years, the health care industry has endured a major shift in
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operations and patient care with the implementation of information technology. In the
past, organizations have relied on paper medical records to for documentation and use of
health data, in which it took longer to review data and make effective long-term
decisions. Implementing IT in health care has allowed for the use of electronic health
and medical records, as well as other ancillary systems that collect and store patient
information. In storing private and protected health information electronically, there are
risks associated in those systems being compromised. For many years, the most common
risk that has affected the healthcare industry has been data breaches where sensitive,
identifiable patient data was accessed by an unauthorized individual. The most recent
risk to the healthcare industry has been ransomware attacks that have caused hospitals to
spend an outrageous amount of money to regain control of their systems.
In the hospital industry, health IT has become a reliable source in patient care.
The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) listed health IT as one of the
top management and performance challenges and also noted that it also poses two major
challenges: ensuring security and access. In terms of security, the department reports that
guaranteeing the secure exchange of electronic information remains a top priority due to
the rise of the Internet of Things (IoT), mobile health technology and use of ransomware
by cybercriminals has contributed to privacy challenges. (Cohen, 2016). With the use of
technology for healthcare, organizations need to be aware of the potential consequences
that could possibly occur. The healthcare industry will always need to be proactive in
how they monitor their systems with the amount of protected health information that are
entered into the electronic health records.
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Recently, Bitglass released a report from over 3,000 IT professionals on cloud
security risks, priorities and capabilities. Fifty-two percent of organizations expect to
increase their overall security budgets. Only 24% of organizations routinely monitor
Saas and IaaS apps for security risks, compared to over 60% for desktops, laptops and the
network perimeter. Only 36% monitor mobile devices. One in three of organizations
reported that they had been hacked more than five times in the past 12 months double the
rate from 2014. Eighty-seven percent of organizations were victims of at least one cyberattack. Ransomware is a major concern, but 54% of enterprises managed to recover data
without paying the ransom.

For 37% of respondents, phishing is the top concern

followed by insider threats (33%) and malware (32%). For organizations that have
adopted the cloud, data encryption (72%), traffic encryption (60%) and access controls
(56%) are the capabilities most in demand. (Marketwired, 2017).
Problem Statement
In recent months, there have been attacks against healthcare organizations through
the use of ransomware attacks. Ransomware is considered to be a type of malware that
restricts or limits access to a device or computer network until the user has paid the
ransom (kaspersky.com).

Although ransomware is a malware, there are multiple types

that could affect a computer network system.

At least five successful ransomware

attacks on healthcare organizations are known: MedStar Health, Hollywood Presbyterian
Medical Center, Methodist Hospital, Desert Valley Hospital, and Chino Valley Medical
Center (Van Alstin, 2016). In these cases, hospitals lost access to patient records and the
only way they were able to regain complete access to their systems were to submit
payment via bitcoin to the entity that conveyed the ransom or successfully recovering
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their systems from backups. Bitcoin is a new payment system that is a completely digital
currency. This is the first peer-to-peer payment network and there are no requirements
for central oversite or middlemen (https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#what-is-bitcoin).

Some

organizations tried to restore their networks using their backup procedures, but
unfortunately did not have luck and their only option was to pay the ransom via bitcoin.
The attacks have generally been treated as individual cases. However, we should learn
from medicine, and treat these events as early cases of a new epidemic in the health care
system.
Prior to 2016, healthcare organizations were an unlikely target for ransomware
attacks. It is a concern that the attention given to the Hollywood Presbyterian attack will
lead

to

future

attacks

on

the

healthcare

system

(http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/ransomware-wreak-havoc-2016-icit-study-says
accessed 06/08/2016). Ransomware can attack desktop or laptop computers and mobile
devices. Ransomware frequently can result in a pop-up demanding a monetary ransom in
exchange for the decryption key. Security experts and law enforcement personnel do not
recommend paying the ransom, however, some organizations do comply when the
encrypted information is difficult to reproduce (Callahan, 2016).
The attacks that have taken place have locked down network systems, encrypting
files and holding them hostage. For many hospital systems, their only choice to get their
files released is to pay the ransom. Throughout research and literature reviews, it is
forecasted that there will be an increase in ransomware attacks against healthcare
organizations in the future. It is important that healthcare organizations review their
current security policies and identify any gaps they may have and implement new
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policies. Additionally, organizations will have start utilizing best practices that will
prevent them from being victims of ransomware attacks in the future. Failure on behalf
of health care organizations to protect their electronic health records systems will cost
them to spend more money over time due to their networks being compromised and held
hostage by ransomware.
Research Question
What Are the Risk Factors for Hospital Ransomware Attacks?
Population
The study population for this research will include all hospitals that have been
affected by ransomware attacks between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2016 within
the United States. Considering there have only been a few reported events during this
time period, a review will be completed for each organization that has publicly available
information about their attacks and the strategies they took to regain control of their
systems.
Assumptions
An assumption made by this study is that all information is being reported in the
news and in relevant literature. Considering that healthcare systems are fairly new to the
digital and electronic age, we can expect to see more organizations affected by
ransomware in the future.

II.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Background
In today’s society, the majority of Americans depend on information technology
in nearly every stage of day to day activities. From banking, to education, transportation
and most recently, health care providers rely on technology for decision making and to
provide patients with information. The way consumers utilize technology on a daily
basis, everyone also needs to be aware of the security risks that could potentially arise
from the exchange of personal information. The ideology of information security was
not integrated early enough into systems and only recently has started to gain warranted
attention. Consequently, it is important to identify and manage these masked
weaknesses, referred to as systems vulnerabilities, and to reduce their harmful impact on
the information systems integrity, confidentiality, and availability.

These system

vulnerabilities are exploited by attacks through hackers, which are becoming more
targeted and sophisticated. In any industry, security risks must be identified, evaluated,
analyzed, treated and reported properly. When a business fail to identify the risks
associated with their technology use and other surrounding factors, they can subject their
organizations to unforeseen consequences that may result in damage to the business.
Although, risks are difficult to eliminate completely, it is possible for them to be reduced
to acceptable levels. These acceptable risks are those that the organization decides to
allow after an evaluation has been conducted to determine if the cost of treating the risks
outweighs the benefits (Al-Ahmad & Mohammad, 2013).
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Information security is particularly defined by three characteristics in which
they are in place to protect information and systems from unauthorized access. These
characteristics and their purpose are:
1. confidentiality- avoid unauthorized release of information
2. integrity- prevent unauthorized revision of information
3. availability- prevention of unauthorized withholding of information or
resources

Considering most Americans input personal information into different
applications using all types of technology, they are also in jeopardy of having
information accessed by unauthorized parties. Consumers of technology cannot solely
rely on applications to provide protection from vulnerabilities, but they must also be
aware and take precautions in what information is shared and then can be exposed by
hackers.

Although the characteristics of security are available, organizations and

technology users should be aware they exist for a reason and should consider what
information they are making available and how they should keep it secured (Ferreira et
al., 2010).
Organizations from every industry are potential targets of having secured
information systems hacked by unauthorized users. The emersion of cybercrime took
place in the late 1970s as the information technology (IT) industry began to take place.
Over time, the cybercrime has become more refined and managed by the criminals that
are responsible for the acts. The implementation of information technology for patient
care has made the healthcare industry a prime target for cybercrime due to the
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availability of data containing sensitive information of the patients. To try and prevent
the unauthorized access of sensitive information through cybercrime, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) implemented physical
and technical safeguards. The physical safeguards include controls for workstation use
and security, device, media, and facility access. The technical safeguards include the
use of a unique identification, an emergency access procedure, automatic logoff, along
with encryption and decryption of information. Although these safeguards are in place,
there have been cases where cybercriminals were able to find ways around them (Kruse
et al., 2017). In these cases, the criminals have used their knowledge, skills and abilities
to intrude their way through networks virtually and lock them down using ransomware
and then holding organizations hostage to their own information systems.
There are at least two dimensions to hospital risk of ransomware hijacking:
a) Risk factors related to IT security
b) Factors related to hospital characteristics
Using the Medical University of South Carolina’s library search resources,
specifically the PubMed portal, an initial query of the database using the term
“malware” , “ransomware” , and “health information security” returned a body of work
that set the baseline from which additional queries were run. Due to the recent events
that have taken place of ransomware attacks in hospitals, the literature review was
selected for articles published between 1/1/2015 and 12/31/2016 and if there was free
full text access available through the Medical University of South Carolina library
search resources, specifically the PubMed portal.
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The initial PubMed query using the term “malware” returned a total of 44
articles. From this query, 22 articles were selected for review. Of those articles, 20 did
not meet the inclusion criteria of empirically based studies related to malware in
hospitals. As a result, two were used in this review. Using the term “ransomware,” the
PubMed database returned a total of 9 articles. From this query, two articles were
selected for review. After removal of duplicates, one was used in this review. Using the
term “health information security,” the PubMed database returned a total of 6020
articles. The query was refined by filtering the return to include only articles published
between 1/1/2015 and 12/31/2016, with free full text access and with the term “health
information security” in the title of the article. From this query, 5 articles were selected
for review. Of those articles, 3 were used in this review. Articles were selected for
review if the query terms appeared in the title or the abstract of the article, if the article
was published between January 1, 2015 and December 31, 2016, and if the reviewer felt
the article was contextually relevant and offered a unique/niche perspective on the
subject area.
A. Ransomware
Ransomware has become a major issue that has begun to affect every industry in
some manner. The adoption of information technology in healthcare has made the
hospital industry prime targets of ransomware. Ransomware is intended to damage or
disable a user’s access to a computer system unless the user pays the ransom. When the
attack has been initiated, users have three options: 1) try to restore their data from
backup; 2) pay the ransom; 3) lose their data.

This article discusses how a socio-

technical approach can address ransomware and outlined four steps that organization can
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take to secure their infrastructure: 1) health IT professionals need to ensure adequate
system protection by correctly installing and configuring computers and networks that
connect them; 2) the health care organizations need to ensure more reliable system
defense by implementing user-focused strategies, including simulation and training on
correct and complete use of computers and network applications; 3) the organization
needs to monitor computer and application use continuously in an effort to detect
suspicious activities and identify and address security problems before they cause harm;
4) organizations need to respond adequately to and recover quickly from ransomware
attacks and take actions to prevent them in future.

Additionally, the article also

discusses recommendations from other sources, including the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST). (Sittig & Singh, 2016).
B. Malware
There are steps that organizations can take to detect core malware sites related to
biomedical information systems. The authors of this article presented a method to locate
malicious website attacks that attempt to attack biomedical information systems. The
method discussed included creating a risk index that would be used to analyze the
centrality between malware sites and it would eliminate the root of the sites by finding
the core-hub node which could help reduce unnecessary security policies. The risk
index is estimated based on the analysis of the various centrality measures and
converting them into a single quantified vector. Through the use of the risk index, it was
determined that the proactive elimination of core malicious websites resulted in an
average improvement in zero-day attack detection of more than 20% (Kim, 2015).
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More than three quarters of the health care industry affected by malware attacks
(Ladika, 2016). The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) hopes to
create standards for laws and regulations governing data security and for investigations
of data breaches. This move comes as a result of health care now being an industry that
is targeted by ransomware attacks and hackers for information. Health care is being
widely infected with malware and has faced ransomware attacks multiple times in recent
years. In comparison to the financial services industry, health care seems to be an easier
target because there are few defenses for the same amounts of data (Ladika, 2016).

C. Health Information Security
Many consumers’ concerns regarding the security and privacy of electronic
health records (EHRs).

The authors conducted a study that would describe the

perceptions regarding privacy and security of medical records and identify factors
associated with the perceptions. The researchers used a nationally representative 20112012 survey and reported on adults’ perceptions regarding privacy and security of
medical records and sharing of health information between providers. In the study,
59.06% of the adults surveyed indicated they had concerns about the security and
privacy of electronic health information. However, many are confident in the privacy
and security of their medical records (Patel et al., 2015).
This article discussed how an information system for hospitals has the ability to
improve access to clinical information and the quality of health care. The authors also
discussion how the use of these systems have presented challenges and concerns over
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health information security.

The research was to assess the status of information

security in administrative, technical and physical safeguards in the university hospitals.
Research was conducted through the use of surveys completed by information
technology (IT) managers who worked in top ranked hospitals associated with medical
universities. The data analyzed indicated the administrative safeguards were arranged at
a medium level, whereas technical and physical safeguards were rated at a strong level.
The researcher’s recommendations for improving the administrative safeguards included
implementing access control models and training users (Mehraeen et al., 2016).
While the majority of studies in this review are theoretical, or implementation
studies, one study was to evaluated computerized health information systems (CHISs),
information security risk management at hospitals in Iran (Zarei & Sadoughi, 2016).
Researchers collected data from 551 hospitals in Iran through the use of a questionnaire
that was designed to assess security risk management for CHISs at the concerned
hospitals. It was discovered that 69% of the hospitals pursue information security
policies and procedures in conformity with the Iran Hospitals Accreditation Standards.
It was noted from the questionnaires that there were no significant structured approach
to risk management at the hospitals that were studied. The research indicated there
should be practical policies developed to improve information security risk management
in Iran’s hospitals (Zarei & Sadoughi, 2016).
Framework
In review of literature, there has not been an established security framework that
is specific to the healthcare industry.

The National Institute of Standards and
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Technology (NIST) have developed a framework that allows organizations to better
guide their cybersecurity activities.

The framework was developed as a voluntary

template that can be applied to nearly any industry and can be as flexible as needed to
support an organization’s security policies. This framework will be used to guide the
analysis of the hospitals which have experienced ransomware attacks and have reported
information to the media.

(Nichols, 2016)
The NIST Cyber Security Framework consists of five sections that an organization can
use to develop their own processes to fall within those sections that will help mitigate
any potential cybercrime within their network. Each section of the framework provides
a different purpose and how it benefits the organization:
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1. Identify- Cultivate an understanding for the organization to manage
cybersecurity risk to the network systems, data and abilities.
2. Protect- Develop and implement safeguards that will guarantee secured
delivery of services.
3. Detect- Develop and implement an algorithm that can identify instances of
cybersecurity events.
4. Respond- Develop and implement an action plan that is deployed when a
cybersecurity event is detected.
5. Recover- Develop and implement a procedure that will be followed to
recover from any catastrophic cybersecurity events.
If each step of this framework is followed, organizations should be able to establish
policies and procedures that will allow them to regain control of their systems and
recover in a timely manner when an event has been detected. The healthcare industry
can use this Framework to complement their current processes for cybersecurity risk.
The Framework was not designed to replace existing processes, but as a resource that
will help determine gaps and how to address them with improved solutions.
Additionally, this Framework can be relied upon for the development of new
cybersecurity

programs

as

well

(https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework).

as

improving

current

programs

III.

METHODOLOGY

Research Design/Method
The study design employs a qualitative review of published news articles and
reports to answer the study question. This exploratory method is appropriate for new
and emerging topics such as ransomware in hospitals. Specifically, qualitative content
analysis is used to compare written text to established guidelines or models (Gagliardi &
Brouwers, 2012). The process will be employed as follows:
A. Identify data source
B. Compile and organize data
C. Begin first review of data
D. Begin second review of data
E. Analyze data through categorization and content analysis
Sample Selection
The sample chosen for this study includes reported cases of malware hijacking
for ransom within the hospital industry. The study design employed a qualitative review
of archival data to answer the study question. We use a multi-step approach to identify
reports, popular press articles, blogs, letters and other sources describing the
ransomware attacks in healthcare. First, we utilized the Medical University of South
Carolina’s online library source, the PubMed portal, to query the database using the term
“malware”, “ransomware”, and “health information security”.
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The “advanced search” feature of the Google search engine was used to search
for “ransomware in healthcare”, narrowing the results by language (English) and region
(United States). There were a number of hospitals in the United States attacked by
ransomware between 2015 and 2016. We specifically searched the internet for these
cases using the hospital name. These are the organizations who systems have been
affected by malware and solicited a ransom to release control of the system back to the
hospitals. We also searched specific professional organization websites for case reports
and white papers related to the incidents, including HIMSS.
Data Collection/Procedure
A two-step process will be used: 1) Extraction of events from newspaper reports,
blogs, IT newsletters and other written or recorded documentation in 2015 and 2016
through the online Google search engine; 2) Use of supplementary data sources on
hospital characteristics to better describe the characteristics of the “victims” of the
attacks.
Data Analysis
A two-step process was used to analyze the data: 1) Using qualitative content
analysis the categories risk from the NIST Cyber Security Framework, each healthcare
ransomware article was coded to identify the categories of risk affecting the individual
incidents. Furthermore, any mentions of best practices, recommendations, or factors that
prevented additional harm to the organization were coded as best practice guidelines to
prevent ransomware. Qualitative and quantitative data was also captured to provide
contextual summaries on each “victim”. 2) The circumstances of each incident were
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compared and contrasted across all cases to the overarching risk factors and guidelines
identified in the prior step.
Two researchers independently reviewed one case to determine appropriateness
of the coding framework. A sample coding guide can be found in Table 1. Upon
consensus, the risk factors framework was applied to all cases. At the completion of this
process, descriptive tables and graphical displays of event characteristics related to a) IT
security issues or risk factors and b) hospital characteristics and their relationship (if
any) to the type of ransomware used in the event were created. This information will be
used to inform healthcare leaders of areas of potential risk to and where the organization
should review to strengthen the security of their network.

Table 1: Content Analysis Framework

Victim 1
Identify

Protect

Detect

Respond

Recover

Victim 2

Victim 3

Victim 4

Victim 5
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Limitations/Delimitations
The study employed a qualitative review of archival data to answer the study
question. This method was chosen as there are limited sources of published data on this
subject and events are recent. The methodology allowed for a review of literature that
was available to the public via online resources. The primary limitation of this study is
the dependence on publication of the details of each ransomware case. In some cases,
there was little description of the event and results. The results contained in this study
are from the hospital industry in the United States that provided information to the
media; therefore its transferability is limited.

IV.

RESULTS
In total we reviewed data for five hospitals that were affected by ransomware

attacks between 2015 and 2016 to determine if there was a trend between the hospitals
that made them prime targets for the hackers.

Table 2 reports the demographic

characteristics of the organization and community associated with the hospital and
where they are located. The research was conducted by employing a qualitative content
analysis review of literature found through the google search engine. The analysis
consisted of 18 articles, in which several reports provided information for multiple cases
that were identified for this study. Content reviewed and analyzed included information
from journal articles, memos, blogs, research studies and white papers that contained
information reported by the hospitals. Due to the nature and events of the attack that
crippled the Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center network system, all of the
additional reported cases referred to this isolated case and provided details of the
hospital’s actions to regain control of their systems.
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Table 2: Demographic Characteristics of Hospitals

Organization Location

Hollywood
Presbyterian
Medical
Center
MedStar
Health
MedStar
Franklin
Square
Medical
Center
MedStar
Georgetown
University
Hospital
MedStar
Good
Samaritan
Hospital
MedStar
Harbor
Hospital
MedStar
Montgomery
Medical
Center
MedStar
National
Rehabilitation
Network
MedStar
St.Mary's
Hospital
MedStar
Southern
Maryland
Hospital
MedStar
Union
Memorial
Hospital

#
Status
Beds

%
Median
Population
Persons
Household
Size
in
Income
Poverty

%
Persons
without
health
insurance
under 65

Los
Angeles,
CA

434

Private
Hospital

10,137,915

$56,196

16.7%

12.5%

Baltimore
County, MD

378

Not-forProfit

831,026

$67,095

9.1%

6.8%

Northwest
Washington,
D.C.

609

Not-forProfit

681,170

$70,848

17.3%

5.8%

Baltimore,
MD

317

Not-forProfit

831,026

$67,095

9.1%

6.8%

Baltimore,
MD

150

Not-forProfit

831,026

$67,095

9.1%

6.8%

Olney, MD

149

Not-forProfit

$133,121

2.6%

3.8%

Northwest
Washington,
D.C.

137

Not-forProfit

681,170

$70,848

17.3%

5.8%

St. Mary's
County, MD

103

Not-forProfit

112,587

$86,987

8.7%

5.0%

Clinton,
MD

262

Not-forProfit

$103,678

4.0%

6.5%

Baltimore,
MD

283

Not-forProfit

$67,095

9.1%

6.8%

831,026
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MedStar
Washington
Hospital
Center
Methodist
Hospital

Northwest
Washington,
D.C.

926

Not-forProfit

681,170

$70,848

17.3%

5.8%

Henderson,
KY

217

Not-forProfit

46,253

$41,036

17%

6.5%

Desert Valley
Hospital

Victorville,
CA

148

Private
Hospital

122,225

$45,894

26.0%

15.80%

Chino Valley
Medical
Center

Chino, CA

126

Private
Hospital

85,595

$72,872

11.6%

13.5%
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Case Studies of Ransomware Incidents

Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center is a private hospital located in the Los
Angeles, California area. Table 3 provides demographic characteristics for this hospital.
The organization offers a variety of services from emergency care to comprehensive
cardiac care, as well as transitional and long term care and is fully accredited by the
Joint Commission.

In February of 2016, the staff at the hospital experienced issues

with their hospital network system which opened an investigation by the IT department.
The investigation revealed that the hospital network system had been hit by a
ransomware virus and the system would be held hostage until the ransom was paid. The
hackers responsible for the attack requested a ransom payment of 40 Bitcoins, the
equivalent of approximately $17,000, from the organization to release hold of their
electronic health system so they could resume patient care (Trubridge, 2017).

During

the time of the attack, it was impossible for healthcare professionals to adequately
provide care to patients, electronically document patient care, complete lab work, share
patient records and review medical history (McDonald, & Silberman, 2016). After ten
days, the hospital leadership team determined that it was best to pay the ransom of 40
Bitcoins so that the organization could regain the access to their network system and
resume normal patient care. The leadership team decided this was the most efficient
way to restore the systems to restore normal operations (Stefanek, 2016).
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Table 3: Demographic Characteristics of Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center

Organization
Location
# Beds
Status
Population Size
Median Household Income
% Persons in Poverty
% Persons without health insurance
under 65

Hollywood Presbyterian Medical
Center
Los Angeles, CA
434
Private Hospital
10,137,915
$56,196
16.7%
12.5%

MedStar Health
MedStar Health, composed of 10 hospitals, is the largest healthcare provider in the
Maryland and Washington, D.C. region. The organization provides aspects of academic
medicine, research and innovation as well as a variety of clinical services for patient care
(https://www.medstarhealth.org/mhs/about-medstar/#q={}).

Table

4

provides

demographic characteristics for this hospital. In March 2016, the hospital chain received
complaints from users not being able to access their electronic information systems for
clinical care. An investigation concluded that the hospital had become a victim of a
ransomware attack.

The attack included a digital ransom note where the hackers

requested 3 Bitcoins, the equivalent of $1250, to unlock a single computer or 45
Bitcoins, the equivalent of $18,500, to unlock all of the computers. The research did not
disclose which particular MedStar facility was the direct target of the ransomware
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attack. As a precaution, when learning one of their hospitals had become a victim of a
ransomware attack, the organization acted quickly to take down all system interfaces to
prevent the virus from spreading throughout the entire organization potentially causing
severe damage. During this time, all facilities were directed to use back-up systems and
revert to paper medical records for clinical care. Within 48 hours of the attack,
MedStar’s IT team had moved to fully restore the three main clinical information
systems supporting patient care. Additionally, there were other clinical systems to be
restored, but priority was given to those related to patient care. Research indicated
Medstar Health used an application server that was vulnerable to hacking due to a
misconfiguration that allowed for unauthorized access from users outside of the
organization. (Ragan, 2016).
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Table 4: Demographic Characteristics of MedStar Health

Organizatio
n (MedStar
Location
Health
System)
MedStar
Franklin
Square
Medical
Center
MedStar
Georgetown
University
Hospital
MedStar
Good
Samaritan
Hospital
MedStar
Harbor
Hospital
MedStar
Montgomer
y Medical
Center
MedStar
National
Rehabilitati
on Network
MedStar
St.Mary's
Hospital
MedStar
Southern
Maryland
Hospital
MedStar
Union
Memorial
Hospital
MedStar
Washington

Baltimore
County,
MD
Northwest
Washingto
n, D.C.

Statu
s

Populatio
n Size

Median
Househol
d Income

378

NotforProfit

831,026

$67,095

9.1%

6.8%

609

NotforProfit

681,170

$70,848

17.3%

5.8%

831,026

$67,095

9.1%

6.8%

831,026

$67,095

9.1%

6.8%

*

$133,121

2.6%

3.8%

681,170

$70,848

17.3%

5.8%

112,587

$86,987

8.7%

5.0%

*

$103,678

4.0%

6.5%

831,026

$67,095

9.1%

6.8%

681,170

$70,848

17.3%

5.8%

#
Bed
s

Baltimore,
MD

317

Baltimore,
MD

150

NotforProfit
NotforProfit

149

NotforProfit

Olney, MD
Northwest
Washingto
n, D.C.
St. Mary's
County,
MD

Clinton,
MD

Baltimore,
MD
Northwest
Washingto

%
Persons
without
health
insuranc
e under
65

%
Person
s in
Povert
y

103

NotforProfit
NotforProfit

262

NotforProfit

137

283
926

NotforProfit
Notfor-
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Hospital

n, D.C.

Profit

* Information not
provided

Methodist Hospital
Methodist hospital is an acute care hospital located in Henderson, Kentucky.
The hospital provides a range of services from general medical to surgical care for
inpatient, outpatient and emergency room patients.

Table 5 provides demographic

characteristics for this hospital. In March of 2016, the hospital was hit with ransomware
when it infected a computer through an attachment on a spam-email and attempted to
spread throughout the network. The hackers provided a ransom note demanding 4
Bitcoins, equivalent to $1600, to unlock the infected machines for the hospital to return
to normal (Trubridge, 2017). During this time, the hospital implemented their internal
emergency alerts that placed messages on the homepage that indicated they were
operating on an internal state of emergency (Pritts, 2016). The hospital took necessary
steps to prevent the entire network from being infected by immediately shutting down
all of the systems and transferring services to its backup system while the primary
system was impacted with the ransomware virus (Kern, 2016). The initial reports
indicated the hospital leadership team was considering paying the ransom to regain
control of their systems. After five days of downtime, the hospital was able to recover
and restore their systems from backups and did not pay the ransom that was being

28
demanded by the hackers (Pritts, 2016). The hospital reported taking action of
restructuring their network to minimize the potential for infection through a similar
attack in the future.
Table 5: Demographic Characteristics of Methodist Hospital
Organization
Location
# Beds
Status
Population Size
Median Household Income
% Persons in Poverty
% Persons without health insurance under
65

Methodist Hospital
Henderson, KY
217
Not-for-Profit
46,253
$41,036
17%
6.5%

Desert Valley Hospital
Desert Valley Hospital, a member of the Prime Healthcare network, is a hospital
located in the Victorville, California area. The hospital is an acute care medical center
that provides state-of-the-art, health care to its community.

Table 6 provides

demographic characteristics for this hospital. In March of 2016, Desert Valley Hospital
reported server disruptions that were determined to be associated with a ransomware
attack. The reports made available to the public did not disclose the ransom amount the
hackers were seeking.

The hospital was able to shut down their systems to prevent

the spread of the virus to the entire network (Pritts, 2016). Reports indicated that the
organization was able to immediately implement their protocols and procedures to
contain and mitigate the disruptions and the hospital was able to remain operational
without impacting the safety of its patients (Snell, 2016). The hospital was able to
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quickly react to the ransomware attack indicating they had a good defense strategy to
fight off the attack without having to pay the ransom.

Table 6: Demographic Characteristics of Desert Valley Hospital
Organization (Prime Healthcare)
Location
# Beds
Status
Population Size
Median Household Income
% Persons in Poverty
% Persons without health insurance under
65

Desert Valley Hospital
Victorville, CA
148
Private Hospital
122,225
$45,894
26.0%
15.80%

Chino Valley Medical Center
Chino Valley Medical Center, a member of the Prime Healthcare network, is a
hospital located in the Chino, California area. The hospital provides emergency services
as well as an intensive care unit and full radiological and laboratory services. Table 7
provides demographic characteristics for this hospital. In March of 2016, Chino Valley
Medical Center reported having a disruption within their network server. After an
investigation, it was determined that the organization had become a victim of
ransomware attack. The research did not indicate a disclosed amount for the ransom.
The hospital was able to shut down their information systems to prevent the virus from
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spreading and infecting the entire network (Pritts, 2016). Through research, reports
indicated that the organization was able to immediately implement protocols and
procedures that were beneficial in helping to contain and mitigate the disruptions which
allowed the hospital to remain operational without impacting the safety of its patients
and their electronic medical records and ancillary systems (Snell, 2016). The hospital
had a good defense strategy in place that allowed them to fight off the attack without
having to pay the ransom and was able to have control of their systems.
Table 7: Demographic Characteristics of Chino Valley Medical Center
Organization (Prime Healthcare)
Location
# Beds
Status
Population Size
Median Household Income
% Persons in Poverty
% Persons without health insurance under
65

Chino Valley Medical Center
Chino, CA
126
Private Hospital
85,595
$72,872
11.6%
13.5%

In table 8, we display a high-level view of the organizations and if they were at
risk in the particular category. In using the NIST Framework to analyze the data, we
were able to determine that all five (100%) of the hospitals met requirements in 3 of the
5 categories we indicated as risk factors. The hospitals performed well in the categories
of “identify”, “protect” and “recover” when they were victims of ransomware attacks.
The research concluded that hospitals were able to quickly identify that their systems
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had been hacked. The hospitals were also able to protect and eventually recover their
systems by paying the ransom or through their backup systems.
There were 3 of the 5 hospitals (60%), that performed well in the “detect”
category and only 2 of the 5 hospitals (40%) performed well in the “respond” category.
The research concluded that the hospitals did not always provide detailed information
surrounding the events of their ransomware attacks, which made it difficult to determine
if the hospital was at risk for the category.
Of the hospital characteristics, there were no significant similarities that stood
out among them that made their organization targets for the ransomware attacks.
Hospitals were located in regions of the west coast, east coast and the south. The
hospitals all ranged in sizes from small to large and were located in rural and urban
areas. Due to the hospitals locations, it is difficult to speculate how and why the hackers
selected the organizations identified in this study.
Table 8: Identified Risk Factors
Organization

Risk Factors

Identify Protect

Detect

Respond Recover

Hollywood Presbyterian

x

x

x

*MedStar Health

x

x

x

Methodist Hospital

x

x

x

**Desert Valley Hospital

x

x

x

x

5
(100%)

x

4
(80%)

x

5
(100%)

x

3

Medical Center

x

Total
n(%)

32

(60%)
**Chino Valley Medical Center

Total n(%)

x

x

x

5 (100%) 5 (100%) 3 (60%) 2 (40%) 5 (100%)

*Consists of multiple facilities
**Prime Healthcare Facilities
X Indicates information identified for this category from research

3
(60%)

V.

DISCUSSION
In total we reviewed data for five hospitals that were affected by ransomware

attacks between 2015 and 2016. In conducting the content analysis, we learned that
hospitals were not transparent in reporting detailed information surrounding the events
of the ransomware attacks they encountered. There are no known reasons to justify as to
why the hospitals only provided limited information to the public about their
ransomware attacks.

A speculation for the failure to share the information is the

hospitals fear they may lose current and potential patients when they learn what has
happened at the organization. With the hospital industry continuously learning about the
challenges that are faced with utilizing information technology for clinical care, it’s
important to share this information so other organizations are aware of what happened
and how the affected organization recovered from the attack. The primary risk factor
among hospitals was the failure to properly update security patches to their network
systems. The failure to complete this step made networks vulnerable to unauthorized
users which resulted in the success of ransomware attacks.
The research of the individual cases always led back to the case of the
Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center attack in Los Angeles, California. The research
provided detailed information about what this hospital experienced and the steps they
took to regain control of their hospital network. Because of the risk of patient care
involved during ransomware attacks, organizations should be aware of what
vulnerabilities their organization have if any when it comes to their network systems.
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Table 8, we displayed a high-level view of the organizations and if they were at risk for
a particular category. In conducting the research, we were able to identify information
for most of the hospitals in a majority of the categories. Both Hollywood Presbyterian
Medical Center and Methodist Hospital provided information that was able to be applied
to each of the categories. There is no link between these two hospitals that would
indicate why more information was provided than the other hospitals. We were able to
locate information on MedStar Health for all categories except the respond category.
This particular case is a large health system that includes multiple hospitals, but there
was a lack of information of their ransomware attack events. This could be potentially
due to the health system not wanting to share detailed accounts with the public that
would cause fear among the healthcare consumers in their region.

Desert Valley

Hospital and Chino Valley Medical Center are separate hospitals but fall under the
Prime Healthcare network. In our research for these two hospitals, there was limited
information that was useful to be applied to all of the categories, and this could be due to
both hospitals being smaller in size compared to the other hospitals and fear of a
reduction of their small patient population.
The amount of information available by both Hollywood Presbyterian Medical
Center and Methodist hospital indicates that these organizations wanted to be open to
the public about what their hospitals had dealt with and how they were able to overcome
the obstacles. In healthcare, most consumers usually tend to visit hospitals that do are
not reported negatively in the news. Events of ransomware attacks could potentially
raise flags among healthcare seekers, instilling fear that the hospital is not safe with their
information. However, the hospitals should be more transparent with reporting the
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information and informing the public of how they plan to prevent these types of events
from happening in the future by being proactive with their information security program.
The results of this study support that there is no transparency in how
organizations are responding and recovering from ransomware attacks. Due to the lack
of information reported to the public of how the hospitals are reacting to these attacks,
there are limitations in determining what the risk factors each hospital may individually
have. The limited information from the hospitals prevents the healthcare industry from
gaining knowledge that could potentially play a role in fighting the possibility of future
ransomware attacks. Due to the healthcare industry not being veterans in IT when it
comes to clinical care, we can expect to see an increase in ransomware attacks among
the healthcare industry.
During the events of the ransomware attacks that targeted these hospitals,
research indicated that information systems and networks were down between 48 hours
and 10 days. When a hospital has to operate in a down-time situation, this could lead to
other disasters for the organization. From the loss of revenue for their facility as well as
placing patients at risk when it comes to their medical care, hospitals must be prepared
to quickly recover from the event to a normal operating schedule.
Next Steps
What’s Next?
Ransomware attacks are not limited to hospitals in the healthcare industry. In the
events that have taken place, the hospitals that have been victims of ransomware attacks
were able to either pay the ransom or restore their systems from backups. In the case of
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Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center, they paid the ransom of $17,000 to regain
control of their systems. If ransomware attacks continue to happen in the healthcare
industry, we can expect to see them expand beyond hospital facilities and start to affect
physician practices. Considering that physician practices are smaller than hospitals, we
can speculate that a ransomware attack could be disastrous to the organization and could
produce catastrophic results that could potential require the practice to shut-down
operations completely and permanently.
Framework
The cybersecurity framework currently has five functions that organized
activities by level with categories associated with each function. The functions organize
activities at their highest level and aid in organization in managing its cybersecurity risk
by organizing information enabling risk management decisions, addressing threads and
improving by learning from previous activities (NIST, 2014). In the current framework
developed by NIST, communications is listed as a category under the respond and
recover function. Considering communications play a major role in the operations of a
hospital, the framework should be modified for the healthcare industry to list this
category as a function and placed between the protect and detect functions.
Policy Implications
In the cases of the ransomware attacks that have taken place, they have all
affected electronic medical records by eliminating access by users to the systems. Most
hospitals have purchased electronic medical record systems from major software
vendors that have developed these systems for healthcare. As ransomware has begun to
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affect these systems, there is a need to determine who should be held accountable for
this happening, whether it is the hospital or the vendor. It is speculated that ransomware
attacks will continue to happen in the healthcare industry in the future. With this
speculation, there is a possibility that the government will need introduce regulations
that will hold the software companies responsible for the software systems they develop
and sell to healthcare organizations. This could be due to the software companies not
having tested their products thoroughly and making sure safeguards are in place that
prevents unauthorized access by users that are outside the organization.
Recommendations
In light of past ransomware attacks, hospitals should start to review their
networks on a consistent schedule, put new protocols in place and utilize best practices
established by the cybersecurity industry. Taking these steps will allow the organization
to frequently review their systems for any possibilities of vulnerabilities. In conducting
a review of literature that discussed ways to prevent being victims of ransomware
attacks, we selected recommendations and created a checklist for hospitals to utilize and
validate their security program. See Table 9 for complete checklist.


“Back up network/systems so recovery is easy” (Zetter, 2016) – This step should
be taken so that in the event of a ransomware attack, the hospital can try and
recover their systems without having to pay the ransom. In completing this step
up on a daily basis, the hospital should be comfortable knowing that if they are
affected, they could restore their systems from the saved backup from the
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previous day. This action could save the hospital thousands of dollars due to
paying the ransom or a loss of revenue.


“Review and validate server backup processes” (Mellen, 2016) – This step
should be taken to verify the backup is complete and data is useful.

In

completing this action, the hospital will know that the precautions they are taking
are useful and can be relied upon in the future if there is an event that causes for
backup to take place. This process can be a manual or automated process that
the organization can frequently test for the reliability of the backup.


“Review your monthly patch management processes” (Mellen, 2016) –This step
should be taken to ensure there are no vulnerabilities within the network. This
action helps to mitigate potential risks to the integrity of the systems. Reviewing
the processes ensures that they are continually effective to the organization in
providing protection where needed.



“Apply any new applicable security patches made available” (Zetter, 2016) –
Complete this step to ensure all security patches are up to date. Automatic
updates to software on computers and networks can happen without a user being
aware, so it is important that this process is monitored on a monthly basis to
ensure the safeguards in place will function the way they are designed to
function.



“Ensure that system software is up to date (operating system, browser plug-ins,
etc.)” (Norton, N.D.) – This step should be taken to verify computers are not
using outdated versions that could potentially place the hospital at risk of an
attack. New viruses are always occurring, and when software is not updated
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regularly, this could potentially lead to unauthorized access by hackers to
infiltrate a device with multiple viruses.


“Evaluate inbound spam and malware protection” (Mellen, 2016) – This step is
done to ensure the software is properly protecting users. Spam and malware
protection plays a major role in protection users and networks by filtering out
things and allowing a user to review before allowing entry. This protects users
that are normally connected to a larger network that will lower the possibility of
an infection getting to a network through a single user.



“Ensure security software is up to date with current subscription” (Norton, N.D.)
– Complete this step to verify the software has the most recent release. Taking
this action plays a role in saving the organization time and money to have to deal
with events that were created due to the lack of security software. This has to be
a regular practice for hospitals considering the amount of patient data that is
shared electronically on a routinely basis.



“Validate that you are leveraging the full set of protection features in your
security product” (Norton, N.D.) – This is done to ensure the security software is
functioning properly at a level of safety for the organization. In validating this
information, it leads the organization to determine if they are not fully utilizing
their security product at maximum capacity



“Validate security management process, which includes a risk analysis to
identify threats and vulnerabilities and implementing security measures to
mitigate or remediate those risks” (HHS, 2016) – This is done to evaluate
whether the procedures in place are current or should be updated.

For the
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hospital industry, they should conduct these risk analyses to be sure that they are
current and up to date with their security program and what actions they are
going to take if they have to deal with potential threats to their systems.


“Validate procedures that guard against and detect malicious software”
(Alessandrini, 2016) – This should be completed to ensure procedures are current
with any new known malware types.

Taking the action in validating these

procedures will provide the organization with the opportunity to prevent events
that are malicious to the hospital.


“Provide effective security awareness training along with a simulated
ransomware attack to demonstrate process in the event of an attack” (HHS,
2016) – This should be completed so that staff is aware of what to look for, and
what to expect in the event of the hospital having to revert to a down-time
process due to a hacking event. Taking this action will give the organization
exposure to what could potentially happen in the event they are faced with a
ransomware attack and know how to quickly transition to operate in those types
of situations.



“Validate firewalls that protect the hospital network” (Weil, 2017) – This should
be done to verify the hospital is protecting their infrastructure from unauthorized
users. Taking actions to verify the hospital network is protected provides an
extra layer of comfort and protection to the organization in knowing they are
protected to a certain level.



“Validate and update security incident response plan” (Mellen, 2016) – This
should be done so there is documentation available to staff in the event of a
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catastrophic disaster that can delay communication among the organization.
Taking the action to validate and update the plan indicates the hospital is
dedicated to providing a level of security to their organization and would like for
everyone to be aware of what to anticipate and how they are expected to play a
role during the time of an unforeseen event.
Although these are our recommendations to prevent becoming a victim of a ransomware
attack, hospital leadership teams should require their IT departments to have a security
program in place that remains current with the best practices that are suggested by the
cybersecurity industry. The security program could be effective in preventing their
hospital systems from being accessed by hackers. In using these recommendations,
hospitals should keep in mind and be aware that only having these polices in place will
not guarantee protection, but it is important that they actively follow the plans they have
in place.
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Table 9: Ransomware Attack Prevention Checklist

• Back up network/systems so recovery is easy

Daily

Monthly

•
•
•
•

Review and validate server backup processes
Review your monthly patch management processes
Apply any new appliciable security patches made available
Ensure that system sofware is up to date (operating system,
browser plug-ins, etc.)

• Evaluate inbound spam and malware protection
• Ensure security software is up to date with current subscription

Quarterly

• Validate that you are leveraging the full set of protection
features in your security product

Semiannually

Annually

• Validate security management process , which includes a risk
analysis to identify threats and vulnerabilities and
implementing security measures to mitigate or remediate those
risks
• Validate procedures that guard against and detect malicious
software
• Provide effective security awareness training along with a
simulated ransomware attack to demonstrate process in the
event of an attack
• Validate firewalls that protect the hospital network
• Validate and update security incident response plan
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Future Research
The focus of this research was to determine what the risk factors for hospital
ransomware attacks were based on a review of hospitals that were targets in 2015 and
2016. Additional research should be conducted to evaluate whether there are any direct
characteristics that links hospitals together to be victims of ransomware attacks. Further
research should be conducted to determine what hospitals are doing internally to prevent
being targets of ransomware attacks and how they provide that information to the
industry.
Conclusion
Overall, study results demonstrate that there are risk factors for hospitals to
become targets for ransomware attacks.

Hospitals have recently started to utilize

information technology on a regular basis for patient care. In any industry, information
systems and networks have the potential for vulnerabilities when they are not routinely
evaluated to ensure there are no possibilities for hacking. Implementing the checklist
proposed in this research provides hospitals with steps they can take at being proactive
to lessen their chances of being victims of ransomware attacks.
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